Can a landlord charge for a pet in Iowa, and what does the law require for an assistance animal?

Yes — no pet figure exists, but a pet deposit is a security deposit however it is named and counts inside the general deposit cap.

Iowa has no pet-deposit statute of any kind: the words pet, animal and breed appear nowhere in chapter 562A or chapter 562B. A refundable pet deposit is money held to secure performance of the rental agreement, so it is a rental deposit under section 562A.6, subsection 12, it sits inside the two months' rent ceiling in section 562A.12, subsection 1, and it carries the same thirty-day return, written-statement and forfeiture rules as the rest of the deposit. There is no separate pet allowance to add on top, no per-animal multiplier, and no assistance-animal exception on the face of the deposit section.

Refundability: A refundable pet deposit is a rental deposit and carries the ordinary return rules. Iowa's definition is a purpose test, not a however-denominated catch-all: a rental deposit is money to secure performance of a residential rental agreement, other than money that is exclusively advance payment of rent (section 562A.6, subsection 12). Because the chapter carries no however-denominated words, no text pulls a genuinely non-refundable pet charge into the deposit rules.

The general deposit cap it sits against: Two months' rent for the whole deposit (section 562A.12, subsection 1). The security-deposits page carries that ceiling with its thirty-day return, written-statement, forfeiture and bad-faith rules.

Yes — no statute caps, authorizes or forbids pet rent or a pet fee.

No Iowa statute caps pet rent, addresses a pet fee, or bars a non-refundable fee that a pet charge could run through. Neither chapter 562A nor chapter 562B uses the word pet, and neither uses the words nonrefundable or however denominated, so there is no general non-refundable-fee rule for a pet fee to fall under. The parties may include in a rental agreement terms and conditions not prohibited by the chapter or other rule of law (section 562A.9, subsection 1), and the only charge the act puts a ceiling on is the late fee (section 562A.9, subsection 4). Iowa sets no reasonableness standard for a pet charge and does not require pet charges to be stated in the lease.

No — but a written-rules or mid-term-change provision would govern a pet rule the landlord adopts.

No Iowa statute requires a lease to say whether pets are allowed, supplies a default when the lease is silent, limits how many pets a tenant may keep, or bars a particular condition on keeping one. What Iowa has instead is a general rules section: a pet rule is enforceable only if it meets the seven conditions in section 562A.18, subsection 1, including written form and notice at the start of the tenancy, and a pet rule adopted mid-term binds only on reasonable notice and only if it is not a substantial modification of the agreement. No housing class carries a pet mandate in the landlord-tenant, civil-rights and local-government chapters; the Iowa Finance Authority's chapter and rules are outside that reading, so the silence is a strong answer rather than a closed one.

When the lease is silent: Iowa supplies no default permitting pets. What fills the gap is the landlord's own rule, which the act folds into the bargain: a rental agreement means the agreement, written or oral, and a valid rule adopted under section 562A.18, embodying the terms and conditions concerning the use and occupancy of the dwelling unit and premises (section 562A.6, subsection 11).

Changing the rule mid-tenancy: Section 562A.18 is the section that would govern a pet rule. A landlord may adopt rules concerning the tenant's use and occupancy of the premises, but a rule binds the tenant only if it is written and if it promotes the convenience, safety or welfare of the tenants, preserves the landlord's property from abusive use or fairly distributes services, is reasonably related to that purpose, applies to all tenants fairly, is explicit enough to tell the tenant what to do, is not a way of evading the landlord's own duties, and the tenant had notice of it when the tenancy was entered into (subsection 1). A rule adopted after the tenant enters into the rental agreement binds the tenant only if reasonable notice of its adoption is given and it does not work a substantial modification of the rental agreement (subsection 2).

Yes.

No Iowa statute limits, authorizes or preempts a landlord's breed, size or weight rule for pets, and there is no breed carve-out for an assistance animal: the word breed appears nowhere in chapter 562A, chapter 562B, chapter 216, chapter 216C, chapter 364, chapter 331, chapter 351 or the Civil Rights Office's rules. Iowa also does not preempt a city's own breed-specific animal ordinance: chapter 351, the dog chapter, carries no preemption or home-rule limitation, and a city may exercise its general powers subject only to limits a state or city law expressly imposes (section 364.2, subsections 2 and 3). The only breed-adjacent limit Iowa places on a landlord is individual rather than categorical: an assistance animal may be refused where that particular animal poses a direct threat to the safety or health of others, or would cause substantial physical damage to the property of others, that no reasonable accommodation can reduce or eliminate (section 216.8B, subsection 6, paragraph (c)).

Yes — a state statute or rule sets what a landlord may request or what a certifier must meet for an assistance animal in housing. The operative rules are statutory. State law incorporates a federal statute or codified regulation by reference.

A person with a disability and a disability-related need may ask a landlord to keep an assistance animal or service animal as a reasonable accommodation in housing, and the landlord must evaluate and respond to the request within a reasonable amount of time (section 216.8B, subsection 2). The landlord must make reasonable accommodations in the rules, policies, practices and services normally required for pets when they are necessary to give the person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling (subsection 6, paragraph (b)), and must give a written determination on the request (subsection 6, paragraph (e)). A request may be denied on four enumerated grounds and no others: an undue financial and administrative hardship on the landlord, a fundamental alteration of the nature of the landlord's operations, an animal that poses a direct threat to the safety or health of others or would cause substantial physical damage to the property of others that no reasonable accommodation can reduce or eliminate, and an accommodation that is not otherwise reasonable (subsection 6, paragraph (c)). The tenant carries a duty of their own: on a request for documentation consistent with the section, the tenant must provide the documentation requested (subsection 7). Two savings clauses close the section: it does not limit the means by which a person may demonstrate a disability or a disability-related need (subsection 9), and it is not to be construed to restrict existing federal law on the right to a reasonable accommodation and equal access to housing, the federal Fair Housing Act included (subsection 10).

Who it binds: Every housing provider, and on the text a wider set than Iowa's general fair-housing prohibitions reach. Section 216.12, subsection 1, exempts an owner-occupied building of not more than two families, fewer than four rooms let inside an owner-occupied dwelling, and an owner-occupied building of not more than four families whose owner qualifies for the homestead credit, but it exempts them from sections 216.8 and 216.8A by name and section 216.8B is not in that list. Section 216.2, subsection 17, names section 216.8B among the unfair or discriminatory practices, so it stands on its own footing. Chapter 216 never defines landlord, section 216.8B carries no unit threshold, and its subsection 8 carries the remedies into chapter 562A and chapter 562B, so a manufactured home community lot is inside the duty too. No Iowa court has construed the interaction, and a contrary answer would have to explain why the practices definition names section 216.8B while the exemption section does not.

The landlord may ask for documentation only where the person's disability or disability-related need is not readily apparent, and then may request supporting information that reasonably supports the person's need for the particular assistance animal being requested; that information may include the written finding described in section 216.8C, subsection 1 (section 216.8B, subsection 3). Where more than one animal is requested, information may be requested for each of them (subsection 5). A registration of any kind, including an identification card, patch, certificate or similar registration obtained electronically or in person, is not sufficient information to reliably establish the disability or the need (subsection 4). The landlord may not request information that discloses a diagnosis or the severity of a disability, or any medical records relating to it, although the person or their legal guardian may choose to disclose such information voluntarily (subsection 6, paragraph (a)). The landlord may require proof of compliance with state and local licensing and vaccination requirements for each animal (subsection 6, paragraph (d)).

A licensed or qualified professional must certify. The law tests the certifier's conduct before issuing. An online certificate is not, by itself, sufficient. An out-of-state provider is expressly allowed. Telehealth documentation is allowed. A landlord may not require medical records, a diagnosis or its severity. The landlord must answer the request in writing, with no deadline stated. A landlord may require proof of vaccination or licensing compliance.

Who may certify: A licensee under chapter 148 (medicine and surgery, and osteopathic medicine and surgery), chapter 148C (physician assistants), chapter 152 (nursing), chapter 154B (psychology), chapter 154C (social work) or chapter 154D (behavioral science), or a licensee of another state who is licensed under a similar law and is in good standing with that state (section 216.8C, subsection 1). The statute names no other source: no agency, caregiver, landlord-supplied evaluator or other third party may supply the finding.

The relationship test: The written finding must certify whether the provider-patient relationship has existed, in person or by telehealth, for at least thirty days between the licensee and the patient or client, and whether the licensee is familiar with the person and the disability before making the finding (section 216.8C, subsection 1, paragraphs (d) and (e)). The statute requires both facts to be stated on the face of the finding; it does not separately say that a finding made inside thirty days is void.

Telehealth: The provider-patient relationship may have existed in person or by telehealth, and the statute puts the two on the same footing for every license class it names (section 216.8C, subsection 1, paragraph (d)). The 2025 amendment restated the clause to read in person or via telehealth, without changing its effect.

The certifier's duties: A licensee asked for documentation under section 216.8B, subsection 3, must make a written finding carrying all eight of the statute's elements: whether the patient or client has a disability; whether the patient has a disability-related need for an assistance animal; the particular assistance the animal provides, if any; certification whether the provider-patient relationship has existed, in person or by telehealth, for at least thirty days; certification whether the licensee is familiar with the person and the disability; the date the finding was issued and the date it expires; the license number and the type of license held; and whether the licensee received a separate or additional fee or other form of compensation solely in exchange for making the finding (section 216.8C, subsection 1). The finding must be made within twelve months of the start of the rental agreement and is valid for twelve months or the term of the agreement, whichever is greater (subsection 2). A licensee who breaks the section may be disciplined by their own licensing board (subsection 3). The agency is directed to create a form in compliance with the section and provide it to the public on its website, and to offer training and consultation to the licensing boards (subsections 4 and 5).

Iowa writes documentation rules on both sides of the letter. A landlord may ask for documentation only where the disability or the need is not readily apparent, may ask only for information that reasonably supports the need for the particular animal, may ask for each animal where more than one is requested, and may not ask for a diagnosis, its severity or medical records; a registration or certificate of any kind, obtained online or in person, is not enough. The person who writes the documentation must be a licensee in one of six named Iowa chapters or an equivalently licensed out-of-state professional in good standing, and the finding must carry eight elements, among them a certification of whether the relationship has lasted thirty days and a disclosure of whether the writer was paid for the finding itself. Telehealth counts, for every license class. The landlord must answer in writing, but no day count is attached, only a reasonable amount of time. Iowa sets no annual re-evaluation duty; instead the finding must be made within twelve months of the start of the tenancy and lasts twelve months or the term of the lease, whichever is longer. The agency is told to create a form and post it, but nothing requires anyone to use it, and the two-question form now published carries none of the eight elements the statute has required since 2024, so a landlord who accepts that form does not receive the finding the statute describes.

Under state law, yes — no state text bars a charge for an assistance animal; the federal rules alone govern it.

No Iowa text bars a pet deposit, a pet fee or pet rent for an assistance animal. The accommodation duty in section 216.8B, subsection 6, paragraph (b), is a duty to make reasonable accommodations in the rules, policies, practices and services normally required for pets; it is a duty of general application, not a charge bar, and the deposit section in chapter 562A carries no assistance-animal exception either. Iowa's only express no-extra-payment words sit in the disability-rights chapter and stop short of housing: section 216C.11, subsection 1, gives a person with a disability the right to be accompanied by a service animal without being required to make additional payment, but only in the places listed in sections 216C.3 and 216C.4, which are streets, sidewalks, public buildings, public facilities and other public places, and common carriers, hotels, lodging places, eating places and other places to which the general public is invited. A dwelling is in neither list, so Iowa does not even have a service-animal charge bar in housing. What limits a pet charge for an animal a landlord must permit is the federal accommodation rule, which the federal section of the 50-state page carries.

The tenant is liable for damage the animal causes like any other tenant, by express words.

A tenant with a disability and a disability-related need for an assistance animal or service animal is liable for any damage done by that animal to the leased premises, to the landlord's property, to any other person's property, or to another person on any of those premises, and every remedy available under chapter 562A or chapter 562B stays open to the landlord (section 216.8B, subsection 8). The rule is broader than an ordinary damage clause, because it reaches injury to a person as well as damage to property. The disability-rights chapter carries a parallel rule for public places, where the person is liable for damage done to any premises or facility by a service animal or a service animal in training (section 216C.11, subsection 1).

An offense or sanction that reaches a misrepresentation made to obtain housing: a misdemeanor and licensing discipline, reaching the person claiming the animal and the certifier who signs. Penalty terms: simple misdemeanor; a fine of at least $105 and not more than $855, which the court may not suspend; and imprisonment of up to 30 days in lieu of or in addition to the fine. The text names no venue and no court has construed its reach, so it reaches housing by its general words.

Since July 1, 2025 the offense has one element: that the person, for the purpose of obtaining a right or privilege set out in state or federal law, intentionally misrepresented an animal in their possession as a service animal or service animal in training (2025 Acts chapter 111, section 1, amending section 216C.11, subsection 3, paragraph (b)). That act struck the two elements the paragraph used to carry, a prior written or verbal warning and knowledge that the animal was not a service animal, so a first-time misrepresentation is now an offense. Conviction is a simple misdemeanor, carrying a fine of at least $105 and not more than $855 and up to thirty days in jail. The offense reaches a service animal and a service animal in training only, so misrepresenting an animal as one that gives emotional support is not an offense here. Its purpose element is venue-neutral and reaches any right or privilege set out in state or federal law, which includes a housing accommodation, so it is not limited to the public places the access right in subsection 1 names, but no Iowa court has construed its reach. The person who writes a false finding is not reached by the offense at all; a licensee faces board discipline instead.

The landlord-side offense: Section 216C.11, subsection 2, makes it a simple misdemeanor to knowingly deny or interfere with the right that section gives, but the right in question is the access right in subsection 1, which reaches only the public places listed in sections 216C.3 and 216C.4. It does not reach a landlord's refusal in a dwelling. A landlord who refuses an accommodation in housing is answerable instead through the civil-rights route, because section 216.8B is an unfair or discriminatory practice under section 216.2, subsection 17.

Who enforces it: The offense is prosecuted as an ordinary simple misdemeanor. Section 903.1, subsection 1, paragraph (a), supplies the fine, which the court may not suspend, and the surcharges added under sections 911.1, 911.2A and 911.5 sit outside the stated maximum. The professional's exposure is separate and is discipline by their own licensing board under section 216.8C, subsection 3, not prosecution.

Only through the fair-housing act, which preserves or devolves local ordinances; no pet-specific grant or bar exists.

Iowa devolves fair housing and preempts nothing that touches pets. Section 216.19 disclaims any intent to occupy the field, preserves local laws that are not inconsistent with the chapter, and lets a city prohibit broader or different categories of unfair or discriminatory practices; a city of twenty-nine thousand or more must keep its own civil-rights agency. No statute authorizes or preempts a local rule on pet deposits, pet rent or pet policies. Chapters 562A and 562B contain no animal words at all, so no preemption clause can sit in them, and the animal provisions in the city and county chapters are about neglected animals and about land used for producing, caring for, feeding or housing animals, which is animal-feeding-operation law rather than a pet in a dwelling. The baseline is home rule: a city may exercise its general powers subject only to limits a state or city law expressly imposes, and an exercise of a city power is inconsistent with a state law only where it is irreconcilable with it (section 364.2, subsections 2 and 3). No Iowa city is known to carry a pets-in-housing ordinance of its own.

The fair-housing act preserves or devolves local ordinances: The civil-rights chapter expressly refuses to occupy the field and preserves local ordinances. Nothing in the chapter is to be construed as an intent of the General Assembly to occupy the field to the exclusion of local laws not inconsistent with it, as an intent to stop a local agency or commission from developing procedures and remedies to protect the rights the chapter secures, or as limiting a city or local government from enacting an ordinance or other law prohibiting broader or different categories of unfair or discriminatory practices. A city of twenty-nine thousand or more must maintain an independent local civil-rights agency or commission. This is fair-housing devolution, not authority over pets. Text: Iowa Code § 216.19 · (1)(a)-(c), (2).