Can a landlord charge for a pet in Tennessee, and what does the law require for an assistance animal?

Yes, with no statutory limit.

No Tennessee statute mentions a pet deposit, and Tennessee caps no security deposit of any kind, so there is no ceiling for a pet deposit to sit under and none for it to count against. What decides the question is the definition: a security deposit is an escrow payment made to the landlord to secure against loss from damage beyond ordinary wear and tear and from the tenant's breach (section 66-28-104, subdivision (14)). A refundable pet deposit held against pet damage answers that description and carries the whole deposit scheme with it in the counties the landlord-tenant act covers: it must sit in an account used only for that purpose at a regulated institution, the tenant must be told where that account is at signing, the move-out inspection rules apply with the tenant's right to be present and a mutually signed damage listing that is conclusive evidence of its accuracy, and a landlord who does not keep the account and listing duties forfeits the right to retain any part of it (section 66-28-301). A non-refundable pet fee is not an escrow payment and falls outside the definition entirely, so no deposit rule reaches it. In the counties the act does not cover there is no deposit statute at all. One express prohibition runs statewide: no deposit may be required for the guide dog of a legally blind tenant whose dog came from a recognized training school, and a violation is a Class C misdemeanor (section 66-7-106).

Yes — pet rent or a pet fee may be charged, and no statute caps it.

Tennessee sets no figure for pet rent, a pet fee or a pet deposit, imposes no reasonableness standard on any of them, and has no bar on non-refundable fees, so all three are lease terms. The statute's only recognition of pet money is the premise of the assistance-animal sections, which let a tenant with a disability ask for an exception to a landlord policy 'that requires any payment by a tenant to have an animal or pet on the premises'. Those words cover a deposit, a fee and monthly rent alike, which is why the exception reaches every form of pet money. Nothing requires a pet charge to be disclosed before signing.

Monthly pet rent: Nothing caps a monthly pet rent or requires it to be reasonable. It is a lease term. One limit reaches it from outside the landlord-tenant act: no local government may pass an ordinance that has the effect of controlling the amount of rent charged, so a city or county cap on pet rent runs into that bar.

A one-time pet fee: A one-time pet fee, refundable or not, is a lease term. Tennessee has no general rule against non-refundable fees anywhere in the landlord-tenant act or the leases chapter, and the only fee ceiling in either is the late fee, which may not exceed ten percent of the rent past due and by its own words covers a charge for the late payment of rent (section 66-28-201, subsection (d)). A non-refundable fee is also outside the security-deposit definition, so the deposit rules do not reach it.

No — but a written-rules or mid-term-change provision would govern a pet rule the landlord adopts.

No Tennessee statute requires a lease to state a pet policy, prescribes a pet clause, supplies a default when the lease is silent, or limits how many animals a tenant may keep. In the counties the landlord-tenant act covers, the section on a landlord's rules is what governs a pet rule: it must apply to all tenants in the premises and be reasonably related to its purpose, and a rule adopted mid-tenancy binds only if reasonable notice is given and it does not work a substantial modification of the agreement, with no consent route round that limit. Elsewhere in the state none of that exists. Where a tenant keeps an animal the lease does not allow, the landlord's route in the covered counties is ordinary material noncompliance: a 14-day cure period, cut to 7 days on a repeat of the same breach within six months (section 66-28-505, subsection (a)). No class of publicly financed housing in Tennessee must allow pets; the state housing agency's own rules contain no animal word at all.

Changing the rule mid-tenancy: In the counties the landlord-tenant act covers, a landlord may adopt rules about the tenant's use and occupancy from time to time, and a rule is enforceable only if its purpose is to promote the convenience, safety or welfare of the tenants, preserve the property from abusive use or fairly distribute services, it is reasonably related to that purpose, it applies to all tenants in the premises, it is explicit enough to tell the tenant what to do, it is not a way round the landlord's own obligations, and the tenant had notice of it at signing (section 66-28-402, subsection (a)). A rule adopted after the tenant signs binds only if reasonable notice of its adoption is given and it does not work a substantial modification of the rental agreement (subsection (b)). Tennessee offers no written-consent route round that: a substantial modification is simply unenforceable. Because valid rules under that section are part of the rental agreement by definition (section 66-28-104, subdivision (12)), a pet rule lives under it. In the counties the act does not cover, no such section exists and the lease alone governs.

Yes.

Tennessee law says nothing about breed, size or weight in rental housing, in either direction and in every housing class. The word 'breed' does not appear in the landlord-tenant act or the leases chapter at all, the civil-rights act's housing part contains no animal word, and no public act of the last sixteen years, out of 8,442, created a breed rule, a breed preemption or a breed-underwriting rule. There is no carve-out saying an assistance animal may not be refused on breed. What a tenant with a disability has instead is the exception mechanism: the assistance-animal sections let the tenant ask for an exception to a landlord policy 'that prohibits or limits animals or pets on the premises', and a breed, size or weight limit is such a limit, so it is met by a documented request rather than by a breed-specific bar. Whether a Tennessee city may pass a breed-specific dog ordinance is not answered by any statute.

Yes — a state statute or rule sets what a landlord may request or what a certifier must meet for an assistance animal in housing. The operative rules are statutory.

A tenant or prospective tenant with a disability who requires the use of a service animal or support animal may request an exception to a landlord's policy that prohibits or limits animals or pets on the premises, or that requires any payment by a tenant to have an animal or pet on the premises (section 66-28-406, subsection (b), and section 66-7-111, subsection (b)). Because the duty runs to a prospective tenant, it reaches the application stage. What the landlord may ask for in return is fixed by subsection (c), and the only ground for saying no is fixed by subsection (e): the landlord may deny the request if the tenant fails to provide accurate, reliable documentation meeting subsection (c) after the landlord asks for it. There is no other denial ground in either section. Two things the sections do not do: they set no deadline for the landlord's answer, and they attach no penalty to a landlord who ignores them, so a tenant's route is the ordinary noncompliance remedy or a claim under the civil-rights act's duty to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices or services (section 4-21-601). Both sections give the landlord an immunity for injuries caused by an animal permitted as an accommodation, and both make a tenant's misrepresentation a material default.

Who it binds: Section 66-7-111 binds every landlord in the state: the leases chapter carries no population threshold, no unit threshold, no owner-occupancy exemption and no exemption clause. Its twin, section 66-28-406, binds only in counties of more than 75,000 people by the 2010 census, a list frozen when a 2021 act deleted 'or any subsequent federal census' from the applicability section, and it is also subject to that chapter's five non-governed arrangements. Both sections carve out public housing units owned by a governmental entity, and the carve-out is narrow: it operates only to the extent the section conflicts with federal or state law. The civil-rights act's exemptions, for an owner-occupied building of no more than two units and for a single rented room, limit only its own housing section by their own words and do not reach either assistance-animal section, so a Tennessee owner-occupied duplex sits outside the civil-rights housing article and still inside sections 66-28-406 and 66-7-111. The guide-dog sections carry a third scope of their own, which excludes a single-family residence whose occupants rent out not more than one room.

A two-tier ceiling, not a floor. Where the individual's disability is not readily apparent or known to the landlord, the landlord may ask for reliable documentation of the disability and of the disability-related need for the animal. Where the disability is readily apparent or known but the need is not, the landlord may ask only for reliable documentation of the need. Where both are readily apparent or known, no documentation may be asked for at all (section 66-28-406, subsection (c), and section 66-7-111, subsection (c)).

An online certificate is not, by itself, sufficient. A caregiver, reliable third party or agency may supply it. An out-of-state provider is expressly allowed. A landlord may not require medical records, a diagnosis or its severity.

Who may certify: Three sources, each of which must have actual knowledge of the individual's disability: a healthcare provider; an individual or entity holding a valid, unrestricted license, certification or registration to serve persons with disabilities; or a caregiver, reliable third party, or a governmental entity (section 66-28-406, subsection (a), subdivision (4)(A)). Two features are unusual. A healthcare provider is defined by the laws of any state, so an out-of-state provider qualifies. And the third source needs no credential at all: Tennessee's test is knowledge of the disability rather than professional standing. What is excluded is documentation provided through a website whose primary function is to supply a certificate, registration, license or similar document for a service or support animal for a fee.

The relationship test: There is no minimum period. Each of the three permitted sources must have 'actual knowledge of an individual's disability' (section 66-28-406, subsection (a), subdivision (4)(A)), which is a state of fact about what the person knows rather than a length of treatment or a number of visits.

Tennessee's documentation rule is short, and it is a ceiling on what a landlord may ask rather than a list of hoops for a tenant. If the disability is not obvious or already known, the landlord may ask for reliable documentation of the disability and of the need for the animal; if the disability is obvious or known but the need is not, only the need may be asked about; if both are obvious or known, nothing may be asked for. Reliable documentation must come from a healthcare provider, from an individual or entity licensed, certified or registered to serve persons with disabilities, or from a caregiver, reliable third party or governmental entity, and in every case that source must have actual knowledge of the disability. The provider may be licensed in any state. Documentation bought from a website whose main business is selling animal certificates or registrations does not count, a rule in force since July 1, 2024; note that both halves matter, because the exclusion reaches a site whose primary function is selling such documents for a fee, not a clinician who happens to send a letter through a web portal. A landlord may verify the documentation, but may not obtain confidential or protected medical records or information about the disability, and no remedy is attached to that bar. Tennessee sets no minimum treatment period, no re-evaluation, no prescribed form, no vaccination rule, no deadline for the landlord's answer, and no duty on the person who writes the documentation.

No — a state bar on an extra charge reaches an emotional support animal on the face of the definition it hangs on; the bar operates by taking the animal out of the pet policy, in a statute.

Tennessee gets to the same place as a charge bar by a different route, and the route matters to a tenant. There is no sentence saying a landlord shall not charge. Instead, a tenant or prospective tenant with a disability may request an exception to any policy that requires a payment to keep an animal, the landlord may ask only for what the documentation rule allows, and the landlord may say no only if the tenant fails to supply accurate, reliable documentation after being asked. No other ground for refusing appears in either section, so a tenant who supplies accurate documentation has the exception and the pet money falls away. The words reach an emotional support animal, because a support animal is defined to include an animal that provides emotional support alleviating an identified symptom or effect of the disability. Two older prohibitions are flat but narrow, and both are statewide: a legally blind tenant whose guide dog came from a recognized training school may not be charged extra compensation for the dog (section 66-7-104), and may not be charged a deposit for it at all (section 66-7-106). The public-accommodation dog-guide section is not a charge rule and does not reach a home.

The definition it hangs on: "'Support animal' means an animal selected to accompany an individual with a disability that has been prescribed or recommended by a healthcare provider to work, provide assistance, or perform tasks for the benefit of the individual with a disability, or provide emotional support that alleviates one (1) or more identified symptoms or effects of the individual's disability" (Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-28-406(a)(6) = § 66-7-111(a)(6)).

Remedy: The exception mechanism carries no penalty of its own and no deadline, so a landlord who refuses without a documentation failure is met by the ordinary noncompliance remedies in the counties the landlord-tenant act covers, or by a claim under the civil-rights act's accommodation duty, now enforced by the Attorney General's civil rights enforcement division or by a private action under section 4-21-311. The one criminal penalty on the landlord's side is narrow: refusing to lease to a legally blind person because of a guide dog, or otherwise violating that section, is a Class C misdemeanor (section 66-7-106).

The assistance-animal sections say nothing about who pays for damage a service or support animal does, which leaves the ordinary deposit and lease rules to do that work. The only express allocation in Tennessee law is for guide dogs: a blind tenant entitled to equal access with a guide dog 'shall be liable for any damages done to the premises by such animal' (section 66-7-104). What the assistance-animal sections give instead runs the other way, as a landlord immunity, stated below.

Landlord immunity: Notwithstanding any other law, a landlord is not liable for injuries by a person's service animal or support animal permitted on the premises as a reasonable accommodation under the federal fair-housing, disability or rehabilitation acts or any other federal, state or local law (section 66-28-406, subsection (g), and section 66-7-111, subsection (g)). Read it for what it covers: injuries caused by an animal that was permitted as an accommodation. It does not allocate damage to the premises, it does not touch the tenant's own liability, and it does not reach an ordinary pet, where a Tennessee landlord who lets a pet policy go unenforced can be held liable for what a tenant's dog does.

An offense or sanction that reaches a misrepresentation made to obtain housing: a misdemeanor and a ground for eviction, reaching the person claiming the animal and the certifier who signs. Penalty terms: a Class B misdemeanor; and one hundred (100) hours of community service, to be completed within six (6) months of an order issued by the court.

A person commits the offense of misrepresentation of a service animal or support animal who knowingly fraudulently represents, as part of a request to keep such an animal in residential rental property under either assistance-animal section, that the person has a disability or a disability-related need; or provides documentation to a landlord under either section's documentation subsection that falsely states an animal is a service or support animal; or makes such a false representation to an employee of a public accommodation (section 39-16-304). It is a Class B misdemeanor, and a person who commits the offense of misrepresentation of a service animal must also perform 100 hours of community service for an organization serving people with disabilities, within six months of the court's order. The first limb can only be committed by the person claiming the animal. The second limb has no subject restriction at all: on its face it reaches whoever hands the landlord a false document, which includes the person who wrote it, and no court has construed it. No warning is required first and there is no affirmative defense. Alongside the offense, and needing no conviction, no knowledge and no warning, the same conduct is a material default that lets the landlord end the tenancy and recover damages and attorney's fees.

The landlord-side offense: One, and it is confined to guide dogs. A landlord who refuses to lease to a legally blind person because of a guide dog, or who otherwise violates that section, commits a Class C misdemeanor (section 66-7-106). A violation of the first-and-second-floor access priority in the neighboring section is a Class C misdemeanor punishable only by a fine of up to $50 (section 66-7-104).

Where the words leave the reach open: The community-service order's reach is unclear on the enacted words. The first sentence of the penalty subsection names the offense in full, 'misrepresentation of a service animal or support animal', while the second sentence, which imposes the 100 hours, names only 'a person who commits the offense of misrepresentation of a service animal'. Read literally the hours attach to the service-animal branch alone; read as shorthand for the offense's short name they attach to all three limbs. The 2023 act that added the order uses exactly the same words as the code, so this is an ambiguity in the enactment rather than a printing artifact, and no court has resolved it.

Who enforces it: Two routes, and they are independent. The criminal offense is prosecuted like any other misdemeanor. The civil route belongs to the landlord and needs no conviction: misrepresentation or false documentation 'is deemed to be material noncompliance and default by the tenant with the rental agreement', and the landlord may terminate the tenancy and recover damages, including reasonable attorney's fees (section 66-28-406, subsection (f), section 66-7-111, subsection (f), and section 66-28-505, subsection (f)). The lease-default limb in the landlord-tenant act does not apply to public housing units owned by a governmental entity to the extent it conflicts with federal or state law.

In part — state law preempts the kinds of local rule named as barred, and any power named is one state law grants.

Tennessee preempts, in two different ways, and neither is about breeds. In the counties the landlord-tenant act covers, that chapter occupies the entire field of landlord and tenant regulation and a county may not add to it, which reaches a local pet-deposit or pet-rent rule; the sentence that spells out the prohibition names county governing bodies only, so the position of a city ordinance inside such a county is unsettled and untested. Statewide, no political subdivision may pass an ordinance controlling the amount of rent charged, which reaches a cap on monthly pet rent, with a private action for damages. What Tennessee does not have is any statute about local breed rules: 8,442 public acts across sixteen years contain no breed enactment in either direction, so a local breed-specific dog ordinance stands or falls on general home-rule law. No Tennessee city has a pet-in-housing ordinance on record here; Nashville and Memphis both sit in counties the landlord-tenant act covers.

The whole landlord-tenant field occupied: In the counties the landlord-tenant act covers, that chapter 'occupies and preempts the entire field of legislation concerning the regulation of landlords and tenants', and the governing body of such a county may not enact or enforce regulations that conflict with, or are an addition to, the chapter. A local pet-deposit cap, pet-rent cap or pet-policy mandate in one of those counties is an addition to the chapter. The express prohibition sentence names county governing bodies only, so whether a city ordinance inside such a county survives the field-occupation sentence is unsettled on the words, and no court has decided it. Text: Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-28-102(e).

Local rent control barred: Statewide, no local governmental unit, meaning any political subdivision including a county or an incorporated municipality, may enact, maintain or enforce an ordinance or resolution that would have the effect of controlling the amount of rent charged for leasing private residential property, and a private action for actual damages lies for a violation. Monthly pet rent is an amount of rent charged, so a local cap on it meets this bar; a cap on a one-time fee or a refundable deposit is further from those words and is not clearly caught. Text: Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 66-35-101, 66-35-102 · § 66-35-102(a), (b)(3).