Can a landlord charge for a pet in Texas, and what does the law require for an assistance animal?

Yes, with no statutory limit.

No Texas statute mentions a pet deposit, and Texas caps no residential security deposit, so there is no ceiling for a pet deposit to sit under and none for it to count against. What governs instead is the definition in section 92.102: a refundable pet deposit is money advanced to secure performance, so it is a security deposit and carries the whole subchapter with it. It must be refunded on or before the 30th day after the tenant surrenders the premises (section 92.103, subsection (a)), it must come back with a written description and itemized list of deductions (section 92.104, subsection (c)), nothing may be retained for normal wear and tear (section 92.104, subsection (b)), and a landlord who keeps it in bad faith faces the penalties in section 92.109. Chapter 92 has no definition of a pet and no per-animal multiplier. One bar applies: a landlord may not require a deposit for a service animal (Human Resources Code section 121.003, subsection (h)), and that section is the only animal exception anywhere in the money rules.

Refundability: Texas neither requires a pet deposit to be refundable nor lets a label make it non-refundable. A refundable pet deposit is a security deposit under section 92.102, which defines one as 'any advance of money, other than a rental application deposit or an advance payment of rent, that is intended primarily to secure performance under a lease of a dwelling'. Money that answers that description is a security deposit whatever the lease calls it.

Yes — no statute caps, authorizes or forbids pet rent or a pet fee.

No Texas statute addresses pet rent or pet fees, sets a ceiling on either, or requires either to be reasonable, and Texas has no general bar on non-refundable fees, so both are lease terms. The one substantive limit is the security-deposit definition in section 92.102: a charge whose purpose is to secure performance is a deposit whatever the lease calls it, and the 30-day refund, the itemization duty and the bad-faith penalties in section 92.109 attach to it. The late-fee ceiling in section 92.019 reaches only a charge for unpaid rent and does not touch a pet charge. Nothing in the chapter requires pet charges to be disclosed before signing. An extra charge, by any name, may not be required for a service animal (Human Resources Code section 121.003, subsection (h)).

Monthly pet rent: Nothing in Texas law addresses a recurring monthly pet charge. It is a lease term, uncapped, and no statute makes it rent or keeps it out of rent for eviction purposes.

A one-time pet fee: A one-time pet fee is not authorized by any statute and is not barred by any statute, because Texas has no general rule against non-refundable fees in a residential lease. The limit is what the money does rather than what it is called: a fee that is in truth intended primarily to secure performance is a security deposit under section 92.102, and a fee paid in lieu of a security deposit is a security deposit for purposes of the chapter unless it buys the insurance described in section 92.111, subsection (e) (section 92.111, subsections (g) and (h)).

No — no statute requires a lease to state a pet policy, and no written-rules provision governs one.

No Texas statute requires a lease to say whether pets are allowed, supplies a default when the lease says nothing, limits how many animals a tenant may keep, or bars a condition such as declawing. None of the lease texts chapter 92 prescribes mentions an animal; they are about repair remedies, family violence, sex offenses and stalking, military service and parking. There is also no rule governing a mid-term change to a pet policy: the one candidate, section 92.013, requires written notice of a rule change only where the change affects the tenant's personal property located outside the dwelling, so a pet living inside the unit is outside its reach. The occupancy limit in section 92.010 counts adults, not animals. No class of publicly financed housing must allow pets; Government Code chapter 2306, the state's housing-finance chapter, says nothing about animals.

Yes.

No Texas statute limits, authorizes or preempts a landlord's breed, size or weight rule for pets, and none carves an assistance animal out of such a rule. The word 'breed' does not appear in the residential tenancy chapter, the manufactured-home chapter, the eviction chapter, the Texas Fair Housing Act, the disability-rights chapter, the fair-housing rules or the state housing-finance chapter. Two breed provisions exist elsewhere and neither reaches a lease: Health and Safety Code section 822.047 lets a county or municipality add dangerous-dog requirements only if they 'are not specific to one breed or several breeds of dogs', which restrains local governments rather than landlords, and Local Government Code section 229.901 protects animal businesses and the retail sale of dogs and cats from municipal rules. The charge bar for a service animal in Human Resources Code section 121.003, subsection (h), is about money, not about breed.

Yes — a disability-title housing right, with no documentation rule. The operative rules are statutory. State law incorporates a federal statute or codified regulation by reference.

Human Resources Code section 121.003, subsection (g), entitles persons with disabilities to 'full and equal access, as other members of the general public, to all housing accommodations offered for rent, lease, or compensation in this state', subject to conditions applicable alike to all persons. Subsection (h) adds the money rule: a person with a total or partial disability who has or obtains a service animal is entitled to that access and 'may not be required to pay extra compensation or make a deposit for the animal', while remaining liable for damage the animal does to the premises except for reasonable wear and tear. The chapter sets no documentation standard for a housing request, no interactive process and no deadline for a landlord's answer, and the two questions it does allow are written for admittance to a public facility rather than to a home (subsections (k) and (l)). Beside chapter 121, and separate from it, the Texas Fair Housing Act makes it discrimination to refuse 'to make a reasonable accommodation in rules, policies, practices, or services' where the accommodation may be necessary to afford a person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling (Property Code section 301.025, subsection (c), paragraph (2)), subject to the direct-threat proviso in subsection (f); the fair-housing rules restate that duty at title 40, section 819.134, and say nothing about an animal. That accommodation duty, not chapter 121, is what a tenant with an emotional support animal has under Texas law, and it says nothing about money.

Who it binds: Two chains, and they do not match. The housing right and the charge bar in Human Resources Code section 121.003, subsections (g) and (h), reach every 'housing accommodation' offered for rent, lease or compensation, and chapter 121 contains no exemption section at all. Its single carve-out sits inside the definition: a single-family residence whose occupants rent, lease or furnish for compensation only one room (section 121.002, subsection 3). There is no owner-occupied exemption, no three-house exemption and no unit threshold, so the charge bar binds a small landlord the fair-housing act would let alone. The Texas Fair Housing Act's reasonable-accommodation duty at section 301.025 is separately exempted by section 301.041 for an owner of three or fewer single-family houses renting without a broker or an advertisement, and for an owner-occupied building of four or fewer units; section 301.041 lists sections 301.021, 301.023, 301.024 and 301.025 by number and cannot reach a section of a different code.

No state text sets a documentation standard for an assistance animal in housing.

Texas sets no documentation rule for an animal request in housing. No statute or rule says what a landlord may ask, who may write a letter, what a writer must have done before writing one, how long a treatment relationship must have lasted, whether an online certificate counts, whether a particular form may be required, whether medical records may be demanded, or how quickly a landlord must answer. The only inquiry clauses in Texas law are in Human Resources Code section 121.003, subsections (k) and (l), and both are confined by their own words to 'admittance to a public facility': a person may not be asked about the qualifications or certifications of a service animal beyond the basic type of assistance it provides, and where the disability is not readily apparent, staff may ask whether the animal is required because of a disability and what work or task it is trained to perform. The Legislature used the defined terms 'public facility' and 'housing accommodations' in the same section and attached the inquiry rules to only one of them. No Texas licensing statute mentions an animal letter, and no Texas statute penalizes the professional who writes one: the psychologist, marriage and family therapist, professional counselor and social worker chapters of the Occupations Code contain no animal term at all.

Under state law, yes — the state bar reaches only a trained service, guide, hearing or assistance dog, or a certified animal; the federal rules still govern an emotional support animal; the bar is an express no-extra-charge clause, in a statute.

A landlord may not require a deposit or any extra compensation for a service animal, and that has been the rule since long before the current codification (Human Resources Code section 121.003, subsection (h)). The bar is broad about money, because 'extra compensation' reaches pet rent and a one-time fee as naturally as it reaches a deposit, and narrow about animals, because it hangs on a term that section 121.002, subsection 1, defines as a canine that is specially trained or equipped to help a person with a disability. An emotional support animal gets nothing from it under state law. Two traps follow. The money chapter itself carries no animal exception at all, so a reader who opens only Property Code chapter 92 will find nothing excluding an assistance animal; and a landlord who does charge faces a fine of not more than $300, which is less than the fine for faking the animal.

The definition it hangs on: "'Assistance animal' and 'service animal' mean a canine that is specially trained or equipped to help a person with a disability and that is used by a person with a disability" (Human Resources Code § 121.002(1)); the charge bar in § 121.003(h) runs to "a person with a total or partial disability who has or obtains a service animal".

Remedy: Charging is an offense by the landlord. A person who violates section 121.003, including by requiring a deposit or extra compensation for a service animal, commits a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $300 and 30 hours of community service, to be completed within one year (section 121.004, subsection (a)). The same person is 'deemed to have deprived a person with a disability of his or her civil liberties', and the tenant may sue for damages with a conclusive presumption of damages of at least $300 (subsection (b)). The 60-day notice and abatement route in section 121.0041 does not gate such a claim: by its own subsection (b) it applies only to actions about design, construction or technical standards.

The tenant is liable for damage beyond ordinary wear and tear, by express words.

The tenant stays liable, with a carve-out written into the same sentence that bars the charge: a person with a service animal 'is liable for damages done to the premises by the animal except for reasonable wear and tear' (Human Resources Code section 121.003, subsection (h)). A person who uses an assistance animal for assistance in travel is liable for any damage the animal does to the premises or facilities, must keep it harnessed or leashed, and answers to an injured person under the ordinary law of injuries caused by animals (section 121.005, subsections (a) and (b)). The same wear-and-tear line runs through the money rules independently: no part of a security deposit may be retained to cover normal wear and tear (Property Code section 92.104, subsection (b)), and 'a landlord may not charge a tenant for normal wear and tear of a dwelling' (section 92.111, subsection (i)).

An offense or sanction that reaches a misrepresentation made to obtain housing: a misdemeanor and community service, reaching the person claiming the animal. Penalty terms: a fine of not more than $1,000; and 30 hours of community service, to be completed in not more than one year. The text names no venue and no court has construed its reach, so it reaches housing by its general words.

A person commits an offense by intentionally or knowingly representing that an animal is an assistance animal or a service animal when the animal is not specially trained or equipped to help a person with a disability (Human Resources Code section 121.006, subsection (a)). It is a misdemeanor: a fine of not more than $1,000, plus 30 hours of community service for an entity serving people with disabilities, to be completed within one year. No warning is required first, and there is no affirmative defense. The offense reaches the person who makes the representation, so in a housing request that is the applicant or tenant; Texas does not penalize the professional who signs a letter, and lying to a professional is not an offense here. Whether it reaches housing is a reading rather than a holding: the section carries no venue words at all, while its neighbors in the same chapter say 'public facility' six times and 'housing accommodations' twice, so the Legislature limited carefully elsewhere and did not limit here. No court has construed the section. The fine was raised from $300 by an act effective September 1, 2023, which also removed the old requirement that the person use a harness or leash to pretend, so a written claim in a rental application is now enough conduct.

The landlord-side offense: The landlord has a mirror offense. A person who violates section 121.003 commits a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $300 and 30 hours of community service, and is deemed to have deprived a person with a disability of his or her civil liberties, with a conclusive presumption of damages of at least $300 in a suit by the tenant (Human Resources Code section 121.004, subsections (a) and (b)).

Who enforces it: A prosecutor brings the charge; the section creates no civil claim for the landlord, no statutory damages and no ground for eviction, and no cure or warning step precedes it. The tenant's route against a landlord who charges or refuses runs the other way, through section 121.004, subsection (b).

In part — state law preempts the kinds of local rule named as barred, and any power named is one state law grants.

Texas occupies the field. Property Code section 1.004, added by the 2023 regulatory consistency act, voids any municipal or county ordinance regulating conduct in a field the Property Code occupies unless another statute expressly authorizes it, and chapter 92 occupies residential tenancy and residential deposits, so a city pet-deposit or pet-rent rule is the clearest case within it. Two honest limits belong beside that: chapter 92 says nothing about pets, the clause's only worked example is eviction ordinances, and no court has applied it to an animal ordinance. A challenge to the 2023 act is alive: the only judgment holding it unconstitutional was reversed on standing grounds in 2025, the mandate issued in June 2026, and a petition for review is before the Supreme Court of Texas in cause number 26-0521, where the State's response is due in early October 2026. No court has held the act invalid. Separately, and not a pet power, the state may refer a fair-housing complaint to a certified municipal agency (section 301.068 and title 40, section 819.171). Two animal provisions restrain cities rather than landlords: a city's dangerous-dog rules may not be breed-specific (Health and Safety Code section 822.047), and cities may not impede animal businesses or the retail sale of dogs and cats (Local Government Code section 229.901). Austin has adopted a rental fee-disclosure ordinance that reaches pet rent and pet fees; the locality page carries it, and no other Texas city has a pet rule of its own on record.

The whole landlord-tenant field occupied: Unless expressly authorized by another statute, a municipality or county may not adopt, enforce or maintain an ordinance, order or rule regulating conduct in a field of regulation occupied by a provision of the Property Code, and an ordinance that does so is void and unenforceable. Residential tenancy generally, and residential security deposits specifically, are occupied by chapter 92, so a municipal pet-deposit or pet-rent cap is the clearest case the clause reaches. No court has applied it to a pet or animal ordinance. Text: Tex. Prop. Code § 1.004 · (a), (b).

The fair-housing act preserves or devolves local ordinances: The state civil rights division may defer a fair-housing proceeding and refer the complaint to a municipality certified by the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development as a substantially equivalent fair housing agency. That is a referral of enforcement, not a grant of power to write a local pet rule. Text: Tex. Prop. Code § 301.068.

Chavez v. Aber, 122 F. Supp. 3d 581 (United States District Court for the Western District of Texas; 2015; residential setting; bears on the assistance-animal rule): Tenants refused permission to keep a mixed-breed dog as an emotional support animal in their rented duplex stated a claim under the Texas Fair Housing Act, and the landlord's motion to dismiss was denied. The court held that the language of section 301.025, subsections (a) and (b) and paragraph (c)(2), is nearly identical to the federal fair-housing provisions it tracks, so the state duty is read the same way. It is a pleading-stage ruling, and it never cites the disability-rights chapter, so it is not authority that an emotional support animal is covered by Human Resources Code chapter 121.

Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 579 S.W.3d 53 (Supreme Court of Texas; 2019; a general statement of law; bears on the topic as a whole): Answering certified questions, the court held that a plasma collection center is a 'public facility' under Human Resources Code section 121.002, subsection 5, and may reject a person with a disability in stated circumstances without discriminating under section 121.003, subsection (a). It is the only construction the state's highest court has given the chapter, and it is about a business open to the public rather than a home; it does not touch the animal definition or the housing subsections.